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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The

Respondent's

"supplement"

the record

brief

and

the

concurrent

do not demonstrate

that

effort

to

the Appellant

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial with
an understanding

of the nature and effect of that waiver.

The

Respondent endeavors to supplement the record pursuant to Rule
11(h) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
procedure

with

constitutional

respect
standard

to

the

imposed

However, the trial court

"waiver"
upon

falls

short

of

the

trial courts

to determine

whether the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and

intelligently

entered.
Despite efforts of the Respondent to sustain the sufficiency
of the evidence on appeal, the Appellant renews his argument that
the evidence

falls woefully short of the standard

required

to

support and sustain a conviction for murder in the first degree.
Furthermore,

Appellant

contends

that

1

it

follows

that

if

the

evidence will not support a conviction for murder

in the first

degree it likewise will not support convictions for
communications

fraud or making a false or fraudulent

insurance

claim because the elements of each of the latter two offenses rely
upon the homicide as providing the essential element constituting
the fraud.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
OR HIS DECISION CONCERNING A WAIVER, IF ANY, WAS MADE
WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF HIS RIGHT TO SUCH A JURY TRIAL.
FURTHERMORE, THE RESPONDENT'S EFFORTS TO SUPPLEMENT THE
RECORD BY CREATING A NEW RECORD IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE
AND APPELLANT'S SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS WERE
DENIED.
In his Appellant's Brief Appellant argues that Section 7735-17(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides that a
Defendant charged with a felony is entitled to a jury trial absent
a showing that the Defendant waived a jury in open court with the
approval of the court and with the consent of the prosecution.
Apparently conceding that the record was silent as to a waiver by
the Appellant of his right to a jury trial in the trial below, the
Respondent sought to remand the appeal to the trial court for the
purpose of supplementing the record.
Upon
Respondent

remand

the

Appellant

to create a new

(R. 134).

objected

record because

2

to

efforts

of

the certified

the
court

reporter who had recorded the trial and ancillary proceedings in
the trial court had already certified the record to the Utah
Supreme Court and there was no record of any proceedings where
Appellant had waived his constitutional right to a jury trial nor
were there any proceedings advising the Appellant of his rights
relative to such a waiver.

(R. 136). Appellant further objected

to the Respondent's efforts to create a record where none existed
because counsel for the Respondent had advised the Utah Supreme
Court at the hearing on the motion to remand that no effort was
being made to create a record.
to determine whether

or

not

The Respondent was merely seeking
the

certified

court

reported and transcribed all matters of record.
Affidavits

were

filed

by

trial

reporter

had

(R. 134).

counsel/

both

for

the

Appellant and for the Respondent/ and the Appellant also filed an
affidavit relating to the procedures followed by the trial court
on the waiver issue.

Appellant's trial counsel verified that he

met with the trial judge and the prosecutor on the morning of the
commencement of the trial.

(R. 137, 144). The Appellant was not

present

meeting

during

counsel's

with

the

trial

judge

or

thereafter, and the trial court was simply notified that Appellant
intended

to waive his jury trial.

Trial defense counsel

then

verifies in two separate affidavits that no further inquiry was
had by the trial court and the trial proceeded
(R. 137, 144) .

3

without a jury.

By affidavit the prosecutor confirms that the meeting with
the trial judge did not occur on the record or in open court, but
was held

in chambers. (R. 141).

However, the prosecutor states

that the Appellant was present at the conference in chambers.
Notably the prosecutor does not allege or affirm that any inquiry
was made by the trial judge as to the basis for the Appellant's
waiver or his knowledge and understanding of his right to a jury
trial.

The prosecutor simply states that "the Court addressed Mr.

Moosman on whether he intended to waive his right to a jury.
defendant said he did.
to commence trial."

The

The Court then adjourned to the courtroom

(R. 141).

The Appellant filed his own affidavit stating that he was not
present at any conference or hearing, in open court or otherwise,
with the trial judge or prosecutor where his waiver of a jury trial
was discussed.

Furthermore, he affirmed that no inquiry was made

as to whether he understood his constitutional or statutory right
to a jury trial.

(R. 143).

Despite

weight

prosecutor's

the

statement

that

ot

the

the

evidence,

trial

including

judge merely

asked

tne
the

Appellant if he intended to waive the jury and nothing more, the
trial judge issued written findings in the form of a memorandum
decision that the Appellant had been informed of his right to a
jury trial by the trial judge and the effect of his waiver. (R.
146).

Thereupon, the matter was remanded to the Supreme Court
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without the opportunity of the Appellant to take exception to the
f i nd i ng s.
The

Appellant

Respondent

and

submits

the

trial

that

court

the

procedure

in creating

employed

by

the

do

not

a new record

conform

to the intent of Rule 11(h) of the Rules of the Supreme

Court.

The Appellant further submits that the procedures

employed

by the Respondent have not found

prior

favor with

the

Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals.
In

Hansen

vs. Stewart,

761

P.2d

14

(Utah

1988) f

where

a

discussion had been held in chambers between trial counsel and the
trial

judge

during

the

trial

of

a case

in

the

First

Judicial

District out of the presence of the court reporter and objections
had

there been made

to certain

jury

instructions

and

the

exact

nature objection had not been made clear, the Utah Supreme Court
on

appeal

record.

refused

to

There, as

allow

in the

the

supplementation

instant

of

case, the parties

the

trial

could

not

agree on what transpired in chambers, and the Supreme Court stated
that

it was

record.

incumbent

They

did

upon

the aggrieved

not, and

the court

challenge to the jury instructions.

party

would

not

to preserve
consider

the

their

(Id. at 1 7 ) .

In the instant case, it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to
preserve

the record below.

the proceedings
substance

of

Where the parties cannot agree

in chambers, even as to who was present and

the

conference,

this

supplementation of the record below.

5

court

should

not

permit

upon
the
the

See also Birch vs. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), in
which the Utah Court of Appeals held that relief from a judgment
would not be granted based upon an alleged statement made by the
trial judge during in camera discussions between the husband and
wife in a divorce case where no record was made of the discussion.
In Birch the court stated that " . . .

a record should be made of

all proceedings of courts of record" and that "that precept applies
to conferences in chambers as well as more
(Id. at

1116).

supplementation

Appellant
sought by

urges

formal proceedings."

this court

the Respondent.

to disallow

As

stated

the

earlier,

neither trial counsel, the Appellant nor the trial judge can agree
upon what transpired

in chambers without a court reporter as it

relates to the issue of a knowing

or voluntary

Appellant of his right to jury trial.

waiver by

the

Even the prosecutor's

affidavit and proffer under Rule 11(h) of the Rules of the Supreme
Court seems to contradict the findings of the trial judge on the
question of whether the trial judge advised the Appellant of his
constitutional and statutory rights.

Because neither the counsel

for the parties nor the judge can agree on the substance of the
meeting in chambers, this court should disallow the trial judge's
findings.

See Hansen, Supra.

The Appellant in his brief previously filed with the court
has cited a number of cases supportive of a finding that the trial
court erred in the procedures it employed in proceeding to try the
Appellant without a jury where the Appellant did not waive his

6

right to a jury in open court and did
voluntarily.

not do so knowingly or

Each rebuts the Respondent's argument that the waiver

was knowingly and voluntarily made.

POINT II
DESPITE THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF FIRST DEGREE
MURDER AND A FORTIORI DOES NOT SUPPORT FINDINGS OF GUILTY
TO COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND FALSE OR FRAUDULENT INSURANCE
CLAIM.
In his brief previously filed with the court the Appellant
has cited this court to its decision in State vs. Walker, 743
191 (Utah 1987), and to the Utah Court of Appeals decision,

P. 2d
State

vs. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987), both of which enunciate
the rule that verdicts from bench trials in criminal cases are
subject to review under the "clearly erroneous" standard specified
in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Appellant argued in his brief originally filed with this
court that a careful scrutiny of the record in the instant case
discloses a number of erroneous findings by the trial court which
are

not

supported

Respondent

by

the

takes exception

evidence

introduced

at

trial.

The

to the Appellant's argument and the

Appellant's citation of the court to the trial court's findings.
Nevertheless, the Appellant

submits that the evidence does not

support the trier of fact's findings.

7

At page 1647 of the transcript, the trial judge ostensibly
refers to the testimony of Trooper Robert Dahle, a Utah Highway
Patrolman who reconstructed the accident as an expert witness for
prosecution.
There

are

(See Trooper Dahle's testimony at Tr. pp 661-766).

sharp

contradictions,

however,

in

Trooper

Dahle's

testimony and the testimony of Dr. Reynold K. Watkins, a professor
of engineering and former head of the engineering department at
Utah State University
Appellant

and

in Logan who testified

reconstructed

the

accident.

in behalf of the
(See

Dr.

Watkins

testimony at Tr. 1146-1212).
The trial judge found that the abrupt turning of the car by
the Appellant constituted an "intentional part on the part of the
driver of running the car off the road with the passenger in it
with an escape route for himself" at a point which the trial judge
described as

" . . .

one of the most dangerous parts in Logan

Canyon, at a point conveniently just past the guardrail, at a point
where an exit could be made if you do it quickly enough just as
the car turns, in which you might let go of the steering wheel just
as it existed (sic) off the shoulder of the road . . ."
(Tr. pg 1647) .
Neither

expert

witness

testified

support the trial judge's finding.

as to

facts which would

Trooper Dahle did state that

the movement of the vehicle off of the roadway would have been a
left to right movement.
movement

would

(Tr. 675).

have been caused
8

He even states that the

by an abrupt movement

of the

steering wheel from left to right causing a sideslip, and although
such

a movement

Trooper

Dahle

could

be consistent

testified

that

the

wicn

an

movement

intentional
could

have

act,
been

accidental resulting from dozing or falling asleep at the wheel.
(Tr. 677, 730). Trooper Dahle, however, cannot place the vehicle
on a specific portion of the roadway

at the time the turn is

begun, and acknowledges that the turn could have been less acute
depending upon where the vehicle was on the roadway when the left
to right movement began.

(Tr. 720).

Dr. Watkins upon recross-

examination by the prosecution testified that the scuff mark to
which

Trooper

Dahle

had

testified

"could

have

been caused

someone falling asleep, a driver who was falling asleep."

by
(Tr.

1209).
Except

for and obscure reference by Trooper

Dahle

to the

curve just east of the accident site being the sharpest curve in
the canyon
silent

with

(Tr. 686-87),
respect

to

the

transcript of the proceedings is

evidence

supporting

the

trial

court's

finding that this area of the Logan Canyon is one of the most
dangerous parts

in the canyon.

There simply was no testimony

presented by either the prosecution or the defense to support this
"fact".
embankment

Neither
was

at

was

there

testimony

that

a

point

conveniently

the

past

fall
the

down

the

guardrail,

although there was testimony that there have been changes of the
road conditions, including the adding of a guardrail.
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(Tr.

1201).

The

facts are that

the accident occurred

during

hours of

darkness on a roadway which was not

illuminated

headlights of the appellant's truck.

The experts did not agree

on the speed of the Appellant's vehicle.

except by the

Trooper Dahle placed

the speed at a "high side or . . . maximum side of 27 miles per
hour to 22 miles per hour on the low side."

(Tr. 673).

Dr.

Watkins placed the speed at 28 to 30 miles per hour at the time
the vehicle left the roadway.

(Tr. 1162).

The trial court found

the slower speed to be the speed of the Appellant's vehicle and
found

that speed, 22 and 27 miles per hour, to be significant.

(Tr. 1646).

Irrespective of the speed of the speed of the Moosman

vehicle, either the Watkins speed or the Dahle speed, it was the
opinion of the expert witnesses that the appellant would have left
the vehicle at the same rate of speed as the vehicle from which he
left.

The appellant submits that based upon the evidence presented

at trial there is no basis for the court to have found that the
appellant calculated his exit from the vehicle to coincide with
his being at a location

"conveniently beyond the guardrail" where

the appellant could jump at the least risk to himself.

(Tr. pp

1647, 1650-510)
Such a finding is a strained interpretation of the evidence.
The expert witnesses produced

by both

the prosecution

and the

defense agreed that the defendant's reaction time and the physics
of the accident would have prevented the appellant from opening
the truck door and jumping out before the truck left the pavement.
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Furthermore, the darkness

of the canyon

and

the speed

of the

vehicle when control was lost mitigate against a finding that the
appellant jumped clear of the out of control truck into an area
predetermined by the appellant to have provided himself a safe
escape.
The trial court places great weight upon the testimony of the
state medical examiner

in concluding that Mrs. Moosman's wounds

were caused by having been struck by a blunt instrument and not by
the accident itself or the action of a body rolling over in the
stream on the rocks.

(Tr. 1648-1650)

The appellant submits,

however, that Dr. Sweeney did not have sufficient contact with the
Mrs. Moosman during

the autopsy examination

opinion as to cause of death.

to have formed

an

In fact, Dr. Sweeney testified that

Mrs. Moosman died from drowning.

(Tr.

1021-1022).

Another "fact" relied upon by the trial court to sustain the
conviction

was

described

by

testimony.

the

Dr.

physical

Bishop

appearance

contrasted

of

with

the

the

Defendant

Appellants

as
own

(Tr. 1644).

Dr. Bishop, the emergency room physician who attended to the
Appellant

on the morning

of the accident

at approximately

one

a.m., described the Appellant as being "covered with dust or dirt
from head to toe . . . lightly covered and not mudcaked."
494G-494H).
"inconsistent

The
with

trial

judge

found

the Defendant's

that

testimony

testimony

(Tr.
to

be

that he had been

wading up and down the river to get out and finding a way to get

11

out, that he'd come up to chest level in the water, which would
make all of his clothes wet,"

(Tr. 1644).

In so finding, the trial totally ignores the testimony of the
Appellant.

The accident occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m.

671, 899-900).
Bishop.

(Tr.

At approximately 1:00 p.m. the Appellant saw Dr.

(Tr. 494G).

During the intervening period the Appellant

climbed from the highway down to the river to provide assistance
to his wife.
4-5).

(See Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts, pp.

It is not unreasonable to assume that water from the river

which would have caused his clothing to get wet would dry by normal
evaporation.

Similarly, dirt which would have accumulated on his

clothing would dry and become somewhat dusty.
The

trial

judge

stated

that

the Appellant's demeanor

and

reactions were sufficient to arouse Bishop's suspicions and cause
him to report his concerns to the authorities
in fact

it was not the Defendant's demeanor

(Tr. 1644-45), when
or reactions

that

prompted the report, but a telephone call received by Bishop from
a third party, one Dr. Graves who had previously employed Mrs.
Moosman.

(Tr. 496-97).

Dr. Bishop later testified as to a visit

he made to the accident scene and offered testimony concerning the
soils at the
Defendant's

scene and

clothing.

compared
(Tr.

those soils with the dirt on

498-98).

scientific basis for the comparison.

However,

there

was

no

Dr. Bishop had no expertise.

Finally, the Respondent quotes Terry Carlsen, a witness for
the prosecution, who testified that the Appellant had told Carlsen
12

on

several

different

occasions

in

the

months

prior

to Mrs.

Moosman's death that he might kill her so that it would appear to
be either an accident or the act of some other person.
29-33).

(Tr.

Carlsen claimed that the Appellant had told him that he

(Appellant) had insurance on Mrs. Moosman's life and that would
provide

him with money

to purchase

property

he wanted.

(Tr.

23-24) . Carlsen also testified that Appellant took out a term life
insurance policy on Mrs. Moosman's life and a whole life policy on
his own life in January 1985 each worth

$100,000.00.

(Tr. 125,

136).
Despite
credence

the

fact

in Carlsen1s

that

the

Respondent

places

testimony, the trial court expressed his

reservations about Carlsen's credibility.
expresses

apparently

his concern

as to Carlsen's

(Tr. 1643).
truthfulness

there is not much weight to be given to his testimony.

The court
and

states

Id.

CONCLUSION
Section 77-35-17 (c) of the Utah Code is specific as to the
requirements

for a waiver of a jury

trial in felony matters.

Despite efforts of the Respondent to supplement the record and
create

a

record

supporting

its

contention

that

the

Appellant

waived the jury trial with a knowledge and understanding of such
a

waiver, the

record

does

not

support

such

a

finding.

The

procedures employed by the trial court were defective on the issue
of waiver, and the Supreme Court should disallow the attempts to
create a new record.

Similarly, it should find that there was not
13

a proper waiver and the case should be reversed because of the
defect in protecting the record and the Appellant's rights.
In the absence of a jury, the trial court proceeded to hear
evidence and

found

the appellant guilty of each of the counts

alleged in the information.

However, the appellant submits that

the evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt
was insufficient to support the conviction on any of the three
counts.

The appellant contends that constitutionally

jury would have viewed

impaneled

the evidence differently than the trial

court sitting without a jury and that the evidence heard by the
trial judge sitting without a jury fails to establish clearly or
convincingly that the Appellant is guilty of the crimes charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ f ^ day of February, 1990.

<^^HJ-<au*,
Robert W. Gutke
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct
copies of the above and

foregoing

Reply Brief of Appellant

to

counsel for the Respondent, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, and
Sandra L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
1990.
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